Speaker of the House
President of the Senate
Both women? Sounds fun!
Saturday, August 30, 2008
Speaker of the House
Thursday, August 28, 2008
I've been delayed a bit by real life in completing the assignment laid out by Galrahn at Information Dissemination, but now I can report some progress.
In my last post, I laid out the tasks required by the Maritime Strategy and the assumptions I would use in filling those tasks. The basic requirement is for two continuous forward deployed elements (WestPac and IO), continuous presence in partnership stations and other commitments, and the ability to win our nation's wars at sea while supporting efforts ashore.
For the forward deployed elements, I built CSGs and ESGs based on those we currently have, but reduced the slight excess in missile power found in some CSGs by adding a 5th-rate FFG of 32 cells in place of an extra DDG.
Based on my 2:1 assumption for continuous deployers, along with 85% operational availability, the force structure to support this commitment is 28.24 DDGs, 14.12 CGs, and 7.06 CVNs, SSNs, FFGs, LHDs, LPDs, and LSDs. (I'll deal with the fractional ships at the end of the analysis).
The next commitment I would address is the partnership stations, where we use various means of soft (and hard) power to influence events but don't need to be fighting battles. We still need some battle force missiles available in each of the regions, but nowhere near what the CSG or ESG require. I used existing commitments, along with some needs that I see, to define these six stations:
- Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 & 2. Currently filled by single DDGs, continue this commitment and add an LCS to each group.
- Fourth Fleet. We currently deploy there ad hoc, with narrowly tailored missions. I believe we should have a more robust presence, and would pair an FFG with an LCS in the Caribbean, Atlantic, and Pacific. I would also provide an LSD with a load of four M80 Stiletto to support small-craft missions and potentially special operations.
- East and West Africa. Each of these regions could benefit from the persistent presence of the US flag, but they don't need high-end battleships for the job. I would form a group for each region, including 1 FFG, 3 LCS, and 1 LSD/M80 unit as in Fourth Fleet.
- Seventh Fleet. In addition to the deployed power of the ESG and CSG, we need the ability to interoperate with our partners in the region on a level close to their own in terms of ship size and capability. We also need more ships because the distances to be covered are just so big. A three-frigate group, with an LSD/M80 team, would give us the ability to show the flag in more places at once, without driving the carrier group all over the place to meet commitments.
The final piece of the puzzle is the power-projection and sea control force, which is basically the surge capability to fight a war if needed. I based this force structure on the assumption that it would fall in on the forward deployed force, adding five CSGs, an amphibious assault Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in the follow-on echelon. The MEB lift analysis was a bit simplistic, based on rotary-wing aircraft spots for the LHD and AAV capacity for the LPD. I also assumed that the fixed-wing strike-fighters of the MEB would deploy with one of the five carriers, and that two SSGNs would be needed to bulk up the initial striking capacity of the force and support the special operators.
The MEF lift was also simplified a bit by using the capacity of Maritime Prepositioning Squadron ONE (MPSRON-1) as a starting point. That squadron has about 750k square feet of rolling stock, 2,800 containers, and 18 million gallons of JP-5. I assumed that a MEF would require about 3.5 times the lift needed for a MEB, then distributed that load across LMSRs (T-AKR), container ships (T-AK), and transport oilers (T-AOT). The oilers might just be the most important part of the operation, and would need to shuttle continuously into the theater to sustain the MEF unless some other arrangement could be made.
Overall, these three requirements add up to a fairly large fleet. I've added up the fractional ship requirements from above, then rounded up to the next integer to determine my total needs.
There are some gaps in this analysis. For example, I did not include replenishment ships for the fleet assets, and I did not include separate assets for the theater ballistic missile defense mission. These numbers are fairly consistent, in terms of total ships, with the US Navy's basic construct of today. The biggest changes:
- the need for a new class of 5th-rate frigate, which could be met by one of the LCS multi-mission combatant designs
- the need for significantly more amphibious lift - LSDs as motherships to M80-sized small craft
- a lot fewer destroyers, which are currently filling the role of the 5th-rate
Monday, August 25, 2008
The Navy's "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" provides an overview of the capabilities needed for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to fulfill their responsibilities to the nation:
Guided by the objectives articulated in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy and the National Strategy for Maritime Security, the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard will act across the full range of military operations to secure the United States from direct attack; secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action; strengthen existing and emerging alliances and partnerships and establish favorable security conditions.
The heart of the document, as it applies to the Navy in particular, is entitled "Maritime Strategic Concept." Many (if not all) of the stated capabilities and tasks in this section have some impact on the force structure, and thus the shipbuilding plan, needed to successfully execute the strategy. Here's my take on those impacts.
U.S. maritime forces will be characterized by regionally concentrated, forward-deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war, and should deterrence fail, win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign.Required:
- ability to keep a discrete amount of combat power, continuously forward deployed (limit/deter)
- ability to surge the amount of forward combat power on short notice (win)
Persistent, mission-tailored maritime forces will be globally distributed in order to contribute to homeland defense-in-depth, foster and sustain cooperative relationships with an expanding set of international partners, and prevent or mitigate disruptions and crises.Required:
- forward forces must be powerful enough to act alone, but small enough to provide multiple layers of defense to the US - forming the Mahanian battle line to force the conclusive battle isn't an option
- forward forces must fit in with international partners (e.g., not all battleships)
A. Regionally Concentrated, Credible Combat Power
Credible combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure our friends and allies of our continuing commitment to regional security, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and peer competitors.Required:
- two discrete, independent sets of forward forces, always deployed
Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime power
Where conflict threatens the global system and our national interests, maritime forces will be ready to respond alongside other elements of national and multi-national power, to give political leaders a range of options for deterrence, escalation and de-escalation. Maritime forces that are persistently present and combat-ready provide the Nation’s primary forcible entry option in an era of declining access, even as they provide the means for this Nation to respond quickly to other crises.Required:
- each forward center must have enough striking power to defeat regional access threats and provide a forcible entry option to the nation
Deter major power war
We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces.Required:
- each forward center must have a first strike capability and credible enough staying power to strike back against the enemy in the event he strikes first - drives increased defensive and offensive capability
- these forward centers might not be able to win on their own after taking the first shot, but must be able to stay in the fight
Win our Nation’s wars
In times of war, our ability to impose local sea control, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore, makes our maritime forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force. This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by a robust sealift capability that can concentrate and sustain forces, sea control and power projection enable extended campaigns ashore.Required:
- ability to establish and maintain regional sea control by eliminating anti-access threats
- enough assault lift for the expected maritime contribution to the land combat plan
- enough immediately available strategic lift capacity to close initial forces within xx days
- enough quickly available strategic lift capacity to keep up the flow of materiel for 6 months; includes replacement for potential combat losses among the immediate strategic lift
Globally Distributed, Mission-Tailored Maritime Forces
The Sea Services will establish a persistent global presence using distributed forces that are organized by mission and comprised of integrated Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard capabilities. This global distribution must extend beyond traditional deployment areas and reflect missions ranging from humanitarian operations to an increased emphasis on counter-terrorism and irregular warfare.
Contribute to homeland defense in depth
Identify and neutralize threats as far from our shores as possibleRequired:
- Surveillance assets in ports of origin for commercial shipping
- Continuous surveillance of approaches to US ports a minimum of xx hours out
Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners
Expanded cooperative relationships with other nations will contribute to the security and stability of the maritime domain for the benefit of all. Although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, trust and cooperation cannot be surged.Required - continuous commitment of forces to regions other then the Gulf and WestPac
Additionally, the Sea Services must become adept at forging international partnerships in coordination with the other U.S. services and government departments. To this end, the Global Maritime Partnerships initiative seeks a cooperative approach to maritime security, promoting the rule of law by countering piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities.
- Standing NATO Maritime Groups (2)
- West Africa (Another numbered fleet some day?)
- 4th Fleet
Summary of the Required Capabilities
To implement the strategy, the sea services "must collectively expand the core capabilities of U.S. seapower" to reach the goals for peacetime engagement and major combat operations. Non-specifically the document calls for an expansion of forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. All of those things are covered in the required capabilities stated above. In order to get to a force level, however, we need to make some assumptions about what types of assets can deliver the capabilities we need, and also about how we want to distribute those capabilities.
1. The "discrete, independent sets of forward forces, always deployed" can be satisfied by today's Carrier Strike Group and Expeditionary Strike Group together in a region. They provide a visible presence in the area, they have the ability to establish localized sea control, and they can project soft or hard power ashore as the situation warrants. The continuous surveillance and area battle force missile count of the ESF establish a baseline for sea control, while the combined power of the air wing, battle force missiles and MEU establish the baseline for power projection. CSG missiles = 350; ESG missiles = 300 (based on current deployed groups listed here).
2.a. The ability to establish regional sea control in support of winning our nation's wars requires multiple strike groups, primarily due to the surveillance area a single group can cover but also limited by the reach of battle force missiles.
b. The forcible entry option from the sea requires at least a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) Assault Echelon - Regimenal Landing Team, Marine Air Group, Brigade Service Support Group.
c. The following forces behind the MEB are at least the size of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) - Marine Division (reinforced), Marine Air Wing, Force Service Support Group.
d. The sustainment effort after forcible entry will continue using available lift for up to 180 days before normal commercial lift can begin to take over the flow. That sustainment effort must support not only the MEF + MEB, but an Army Corps and an Air Expeditionary Force. The primary drivers for this lift are Class V and Class III.
3. Each Global Maritime Partnership station requires the assignment of at least one ship full time, and these commitments will grow from those identified above. The types may vary depending on the particular needs of the station. Assume that the total commitment is six ships.
4. Continuous requirements (1) and (3) each need two others in the pipeline to allow for normal rotations.
5. Major maintenance planned for any one conventional ship consumes 15% of its service life (e.g., 4.5 years over 30), 20% for a nuke.
6. Aircraft carrier and air wing force levels are outside the scope of this analysis.
So with all that out of the way, now I'm ready to lay out the total force requirements to satisfy the requirements. Unfortunately, that won't happen today. Stay tuned!
Galrahn has laid down a challenge to Naval bloggers concerning the current shipbuilding plan:
"Given Huntington's advice, the Navy's existing plan, the operational considerations, the Maritime Strategy, and $35 [sic] billion over 5 years... what would be your shipbuilding plan, and why? The FY09-FY13 plan the Navy released in this budget year can be found here for comparison. Remember, we are talking about 5 years from FY10 - FY14 here, but it should be part of a larger strategy."
So far, Galrahn has provided his own plan, in which he emphasizes adding sealift and motherships over more battleships like the Arleigh Burke or Zumwalt classes. He also alters the Navy's LCS plans to purchase multi-mission combatants based on the same hulls, creating some sixth-rates to balance out the line of battle. In the process, he exceeds the $65 billion budget by 15%, which makes me think he's missed something.
Mike Burleson at New Wars takes a different approach:
Notice my emphasis on littoral warships, which I think is where the Navy needs to be for now. A total freeze on Big Ship production would ensue with FY10, and several classes would be delayed or canceled outright. None of the poorly defended and too costly DDG-1000s would ever hit the water in my budget. Ever!Mike's plan buys 301 ships and craft in the five-year period; it includes 20 Virginia-class SSNs, 25 HSVs, 50 Sea Fighters, 200 Stiletto fast attack craft (FAC), and six Large Medium Speed RO/RO ships.
Updated (8/26 07:40): Moose at Theory on Everything chimes in with his thoughts. In addition to the Navy, Moose includes the commitment to Coast Guard resources - the first forward thinker I've seen make this link. He's got some other good ideas in there as well.
The shipbuilding plan, as Galrahn noted, has to be "part of a larger strategy." One of the key criticisms of the Navy's plan is that it does not tie to the Navy's own "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower." Compounding the problem, the strategy does not discuss the specific means of execution.
The first task in building a plan, for any effort, is to understand the desired end state. The strategy provides that end state as a set of capabilities and tasks for the Maritime Force, each of which has some force structure implication. By matching up the capabilities needed with the current (and projected) fleet, we can develop some recommendations on modifying the shipbuilding plan to achieve the ends desired.
My take on the required capabilities, gaps in the current plan, and a possible solution is coming up in a later post.
Sunday, August 24, 2008
... in haiku.
Need a running mate
who will make me look like more
than a neophyte.
Reach into the past?
Al Gore has experience.
But George Bush beat him.
Could be I will pick
Nah. Wes Clark wants her.
I beat the pantsuit off her.
No way she gets it.
Fast Eddy Rendell?
Could shore up Pennsylvania,
but he endorsed Her.
I like that Tim Kaine
but Republicans would shout
"It rhymes with Hussein!"
Bayh is pretty good.
Indiana's a Red State
Can he help me win?
I pick Joe Biden
to run for Vice President
cuz he's an old dude.
"Barack Obama has made an excellent choice in Joe Biden, for many reasons, and it is a proud day for Delawareans and the Bidens. A big congratulations go out to Joe, Jill, Hunter, Beau, Ashley, the Owens family and the extended Biden clan.
That said, there is a message in all of this.
When faced with an important choice between change (Sebelius, Kaine) and experience (Bayh, Biden), Barack Obama chose experience.
So should you."
They almost make it too easy, don't they?
Somehow the mighty Western navies see anti-piracy as beneath them, which is remarkable since in years past they collectively managed to handle outbreaks quite well. We often forget that the vaunted Golden Age of Piracy in the early 1700s was short lived when the Royal Navy got involved to stamp it out. Later the Barbary Pirates were easily suppressed after America and Britain finished fighting one another in the War of 1812.
I think if the US and her allies can humble themselves a while, they could easily end this scourge while it is mostly contained in the Western Indian Ocean. Taking the counter-insurgency lesson learned after much trial and error on land and applying it to the sea, the Navy might just find a renewed mission and favor with the public, which it has been desperately seeking since the Cold War.
Mike is right, the scourge can be ended. As sailors, we recognize the threat that pirates pose to freedom of communication on the seas, and know instinctively that they must be eliminated. It is not beneath a sailor to kill a pirate, and the problem is one entirely of national will.
The young American nation sent its Navy after the Barbary pirates because her vital national interests (i.e., the ability to freely trade in the Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic) were threatened. The Royal Navy motivation was the same, except that they made a global rather than local commitment.
The United States and her allies don't need to "humble themselves a while," they need to recognize that (a) pirates are a threat to global commerce wherever they operate, and (b) navies, not police and lawyers, are best suited to the task of eliminating global threats on the seas.
The real challenge to this will be convincing the American public that their national interests are threatened, because so little international shipping rides in American-flagged or American-owned hulls. According to the data on the Maritime Administration web site, only 1.47% of the total deadweight tons in the world fleet sail under the US flag on 286 ships; 4.26% of the world tonnage capacity is US-owned - 207 dry bulk, 52 container ships, 69 RO/RO, 318 tankers, and 38 general cargo ships. Given that most of the US-flagged fleet is likely limited to service between US ports, their risk of a pirate encounter is extremely low, and the American-owned ships in international trade are likely operated with foreign crews.
The clear and present danger to world freedom just doesn't register on the American consciousness yet. It will take a concerted effort by the national leadership to inform and persuade them. I'm afraid that the influential bandwidth needed for this effort just doesn't exist in Washington today, especially with an election looming.